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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-OPENING THE
"DOGGY DOOR" FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS AND
OTHER ISSUES UNDER THE EMERGENCY AID
EXCEPTION-COMMONWEALTH V DUNCAN, 7
N.E.3D 469 (MASS. 2014).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution was
designed to protect individuals' expectations of privacy within their homes
by prohibiting unwarranted searches and seizures.' Not only is this right
codified in the United States Constitution, but all state constitutions also
promulgate similar provisions against unwarranted searches and seizures,
reinforcing the importance of safeguarding this constitutional right. 2 This
right, though fundamental, however is not an absolute right, since the
touchstone of these provisions is reasonableness, creating specific
exceptional circumstances where warrantless entry would be permissible.3
As logic would require, prohibiting a warrantless entry in circumstances
where one's life or safety is in jeopardy would be unreasonable and the4
searches .
unreasonable
for
intended
are
protections

1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
2 See MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV ("Every subject has a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his
possessions."); see also ALA. CONST. art. I, § 5; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14; ARtz. CONST. art.
II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 7; DEL.
CONST. art. I, § 6; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 13; HAW. CONST. art. I,
§ 7; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; IND. CONST. art. I, § 11; IOWA CONST. art
I, § 8; KAN. CONST. art. I, § 15; Ky. CONST. Bill of Rights § 10; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; ME.
CONST. art. I, § 5; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights art. 26; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 11; MINN.
CONST. art. I, § 10; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 23; MO. CONST. art. I, § 15; MONT. CONST. art. II, §
11; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 7; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 18; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 19; N.J. CONST. art.
I, para. 7; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 10; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; N.D.
CONST. art. I, § 8; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 30; OR. CONST. art. I, § 9;
PA. CONST. art. I, § 8; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 6; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 11;
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 7; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 9; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 14; VT. CONST. ch. I, art.
XI; VA. CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 6; WIS. CONST.
art. I, § 11; WYO. CONST. art, I, § 4.
3 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-58 (1967) (affirming that "specifically
established and well-delineated" exceptions can overcome adherence to judicial processes); see
also Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 363-64 (8th Cir. 1971) (discussing exceptions to search
warrant requirement).
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures); Mincey v.
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One such exception to the warrant requirement is the emergency aid
exception, a creature of the common law that permits officers to enter
property without a warrant provided that they have an objectively
reasonable belief that a person is in immediate need of assistance.5 The
emergency aid doctrine was evidently intended for preservation of human
life, however the propriety of its application to animal life has been a novel
and uncertain issue.6 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
("SJC") confronted this question in Commonwealth v. Duncan and boldly
answered in the affirmative by using public policy to drive their reasoning.
7

A neighbor of the defendant, Heather Duncan, called the policy to
inform them that three emaciated-looking dogs were laying outside on
Duncan's property." This was particularly concerning due to the severe
winter weather that day and during the week prior. 9 The police responded
to this call and upon arriving at Duncan's property, they heard hoarse
barking and whimpering. 1° Since the yard was enclosed by a private fence
that obstructed the officers' view, they stepped onto a snow bank to gain a
better view of the dogs and better assess the situation." The officers
observed three dogs-two appeared to be deceased and the third was2
barking-leashed to a fence with no food or water available to them.

Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (recognizing that Fourth Amendment does not preclude
"warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of
immediate aid."); see also Joseph L. Hubbard, Jr., Case Comment, Expanding the Emergency Aid
Doctrine in State v. Frankel: WarrantlessSeizure of Privacy Interests or Justifiable Assurances
ofthe Protection?, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 213, 216 (2004) (discussing "common sense" origins
of exceptions to right against warrantless searches and seizures); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment FirstPrinciples, 107 HARv. L. REv. 757 (1994) (discussing exceptions to the warrant
requirement dictated by common sense).
5 See Commonwealth v. Peters, 905 N.E.2d 1111, 1116-19 (Mass. 2009) (discussing
requirements of emergency aid exception to Fourth Amendment and Article XIV); see also
Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (explaining need for emergency aid
exception because "[p]eople could well die in emergencies if people tried to act with the calm
deliberation associated with the judicial process.); Commonwealth v. Snell, 704 N.E.2d 236, 24243 (Mass. 1999) (detailing the application of the emergency aid exception).
6 See Shapiro v. City of Glen Cove, 236 Fed. App'x 645, 646 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining
uncertainty of applying exigent circumstances exception to animal life); Commonwealth v.
Erickson, 905 N.E.2d 127 (Mass. 2009).
7 7 N.E.3d 469, 476 (Mass. 2014) (concluding protection of emergency aid exception should
apply to animals in appropriate circumstances).
8 See id. at 472 (detailing officers' investigation and subsequent actions).
9 See id. (describing unfavorable conditions that dogs were found in).
10 See id. (noting that dogs sounded in distress).
11 See Commonwealth v. Duncan, 7 N.E.3d 469, 474 (Mass. 2014) (describing officers'
efforts to assess dogs' condition).
12 See id. at 471. (same).
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The padlocked fence prevented officers from gaining access and
rendering aid to the dogs. 3 The responding officers attempted to contact
the property's residents by using the air horn on their police cruiser, as well
as searching for the registered property owner's contact information
through the water and sewer directory. 1 4 Despite their various attempts and
efforts, the responding officers were unsuccessful in contacting the
property owners.' 5 Ultimately, the officers resorted to contacting the fire
department to request that they remove the lock on the fence, pursuant to
the protocol for handling emergencies involving animals.16 Once the lock
17
was removed, they entered the yard and removed the dogs.
Duncan was subsequently charged with three counts of animal cruelty.' 8
At the trial level, the court granted Duncan's motion to suppress evidence
based on the officers' warrantless entry, rendering the seizure of the dogs
improper. 9 Although the motion was allowed, the judge submitted a
question of law to the Massachusetts Appeals Court.2 0 This case was one
of first impression with significant implications, prompting the
Massachusetts Appeals Court to submit it to the SJC for direct appellate
review. 2 1 On review, the SJC interpreted the doctrine to encompass
situations were animal life was in danger and thus, concluded that the
motion to suppress was improperly granted.22 Their reasoning underlying
this conclusion was that this application would further the legislature's
heavy policy interests in protecting animals and preventing cruelty.23
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 14
of the Massachusetts Constitution are coterminous in relation to the
protections they provide against warrantless entry into an individual's

13
14

See id. (same).
See id. at 471-72 (describing officers' efforts to address situation prior to entering

Duncan's yard).
15 Id. at 472.
16 See Commonwealth v. Duncan, 7 N.E.3d 469, 471-72 (Mass. 2014) (outlining officers'
further actions to provide aid to dogs).
17 Id.
18 See id.; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 77 (2014) (proscribing cruelty to animals)
19 See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 471-72 (noting District Court judge's allowance of motion to
suppress evidence of emaciated dogs).
20 See id. (questioning application of emergency aid doctrine to animal life). The situation in
question did indeed rise to the level of being an exigency, but the issue here was whether this
exact type of exigency, specifically one involving animals, fell within the ambit of the doctrine.
Id.
21 See id. at 471 (addressing whether warrantless entry to aid animals should be included in
emergency aid exception).
22 See id. at 474-75 (holding that certain situations permit warrantless entry to protect animal
life).
23 See id. at 474 (explaining policy interest in prevention of animal cruelty).
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home.24 This fundamental right stemming from the adage that "every25
man's home is his castle" has been deeply rooted within the Constitution.
Now encoded in the United States Constitution and all state constitutions,
this axiomatic right was a product of the colonials' experience and their
struggles against British authority. 26 Resentful of the tyrannical British
authority, the amendment was designed to safeguard privacy rights and
prevent arbitrary governmental intrusions.27 Throughout American history,
a vast array of case law has developed that confirms courts' interests in
protecting this right.28
The expectation of privacy within one's own home may be a
Constitutional right, however there are exceptions when warrantless entries
by government officials are permissible.2 9 Since the text of the amendment

24

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting public from unwarranted searches and seizures by

government actors); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV (same); see also Thomas Y. Davies,
Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547, 577-79 (1999) (discussing
Framers' intent and beliefs regarding search warrants).
25 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (explaining common law maxim's
influence in American law); Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 95 Eng. 807
(1765) (describing men's right to be secure in their property); see also Jonathan L. Hafetz, 'A
Man's Home is His Castle? ": Reflections on the Home, the Family, andPrivacy During the Late
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 174, 182-83 (2002)
(discussing British tyramnny's influence on Fourth Amendment's creation).
26 See Hafetz, supra note 25, at 182-83 (discussing colonial origins and history of Fourth
Amendment); see also See Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis, and
Interpretation Centennial Edition Interim Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure, U.S.
Government
Publishing
Office
1199,
1199-1200
(July
1,
2014),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-1992/pdf/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-5.pdf
(explaining British tyranny's influence on Framers). In the colonies, British officers were granted
writs of assistance, which operated like general search warrants, allowing their holders to enter
any property for the purposes of search and seizure. See U.S. Government Publishing Office,
supra, at 1200. This type of oppression influenced the Framers to craft the Fourth Amendment.
See id; see also Hafetz, supra note 25, at 182-83.
27 See U.S. Government Publishing Office, supra note 26, at 1200; Hafetz, supra note 25, at
182-83. The Fourth Amendment posits importance on the warrant requirement and the threshold
that must be satisfied to justify searches and seizures. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The
importance of obtaining a search warrant prior to entry into one's private home is also
emphasized in Article 14 of the Massachusetts Constitution. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV.
28 See Camara v. Mun. Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528-34 (granting general
administrative search warrant violated Fourth Amendment protection of privacy); see also Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("[Requiring] deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial
officer ...
be interposed between the citizen[s] and the police.
); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 740 (1979) (establishing two-pronged test for Fourth Amendment violation analysis); Stoner
v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (averring that warrantless searches violate one's
reasonable expectation of privacy).
29 See Davis v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1043, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (explaining warrantless
entry is not violation when police have legitimate investigatory reason for entry); Commonwealth
v. Peters, 905 N.E.2d 1111, 1114 (Mass. 2009) (justifying warrantless entry by police with
narrow category of exceptions); Commonwealth v. Knowles, 883 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2008)

348

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XX

only guards the right against "unreasonable" searches and seizures, it
logically follows that carefully delineated exceptions exist, such as the
emergency aid exception and the plain view doctrine. 0 The emergency aid

doctrine is a common law exception that allows for officers to enter
individuals' property contingent on there being an objectively reasonable
belief that a person is in need of immediate assistance. 31 At its inception,
the clear intent of this doctrine's application was to preserve human life,
however its application
in the realm of animal life remains largely
32
territory.
uncharted
All states have enacted laws that proscribe animal cruelty, a crime which
a majority of states have elevated to felony status. 33 In Massachusetts,
section 77 of chapter 272 was promulgated in the 1870s to criminalize
animal cruelty. 34 The statute was subsequently amended to expand the

(holding that "[t]oo broad an application of this exception would undercut the important principle
that intrusions on a citizen's liberty.
); see also Mary Elisabeth Naumann, Note, The
Community CaretakerDoctrine: Yet Another Fourth Amendment Exception, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L.
325, 331-40 (1999) (describing Fourth Amendment and its exceptions).
30 See Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361,364 (8th Cir. 1971) ("It has long been settled that
objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be introduced into evidence."); Commonwealth v. Tyree, 919
N.E.2d 660, 678 (Mass. 2010) (affirming that officers can seize evidence in plain view if legally
on property); Commonwealth v. Balicki, 762 N.E.2d 290, 297 (Mass. 2002) (concluding that
evidence was admissible because in plain view); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 710 N.E.2d 584,
586 (Mass. 1999) (justifying warrantless entry due to exigent circumstances); Commonwealth v.
Ringgard, 880 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) ("It has long been recognized that 'a
warrant is not required to ...
enter a burning home to rescue occupants ......
");Davies, supra note
24, at 555-60 (discussing modem definition of reasonableness under Fourth Amendment).
31 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978) (recognizing that protecting lives is
justifiable exception to warrant requirement); Commonwealth v. Forde, 329 N.E.2d 717, 719-20
(Mass. 1975) (explaining that warrantless entry must be motivated by safety concerns and may
not be investigatory).
32 See Brief for Appellee, Commonwealth v. Duncan, 7 N.E.3d 469 (Mass. 2014) (No. SJC11373), 2013 WL 8022602, at *23-24 [hereinafter Brief for Appellee] (contending that
Massachusetts has never applied emergency aid doctrine to animals); see also Massachusetts
Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 158 N.E.2d 487, 495
(Mass. 1959) (explaining that rights of animals not protected by constitution unlike rights of
persons); Brieffor Appellee, supra, at *24 (explicating that animals are regarded as property and
not considered when calculating tort damages).
33 See ARtz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2910 (2014) (proscribing cruel treatment to animals);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 597 (2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-247 (2015); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, §
1325(b) (2014); FLA. STAT. § 828.12(2) (2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 25- 3503 (2014); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:102.1(B)(4) (2014); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-41-15 (2014); MO. REV. STAT. §
578.012 (2014); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1009(2) (2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:8(111-a)
(2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360(b) (2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1685 (2014); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 4-1-5(a) (2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 352a, 353 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE §
16.52.205(2) (2014); Wis. STAY. § 951.18 (2014).
34 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 77 (2012) (proscribing cruel treatment of animals); see
also Commonwealth v. Turner, 14 N.E. 130, 132 (Mass. 1887) (holding that captive fox was
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conduct encompassed and increase the severity of penalties for those found
in violation.3 5 Since this statute's enactment, case law has shaped the law
surrounding animal rights and cruelty prevention.3 6
Gradual expansion of animal rights introduced the inquiry of whether the
emergency aid doctrine applies to animals and has progressed to a point

where several state courts have confronted this question, with some that
have answered in the affirmative.37

On the issue of interpreting the

within definition of "animal" for purposes of section 77); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 80 (5th ed.
1979) (defining animal as "non-human, animate being which is endowed with the power of
voluntary motion"). There has been a long-standing interest in protecting animals and existing
statutes designed to prevent animal abuse have been expanded. See Commonwealth v. Tilton, 49
Mass. (8 Met.) 232, 234-35 (1844). Where the defendant contended that his engaging in rooster
fighting was not proscribed by the statute and that there was no statute on point proscribing the
specific act of rooster fighting, the court analogized and molded the facts to fall within the
purview of other statutes. See id. at 234. Ultimately, the common thread was that these acts of
cruelty harming animals were against humanity and therefore, no different. See id.
35 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 77, 89, 94-95 (2012) (enacting laws designed
to
prevent animals from being used for fighting). From the extensive legislation designed to protect
animals, an inference that the legislature has taken significant interest in this issue can be drawn.
See Brief & Record App'x for the Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Duncan, 7 N.E.3d 469
(Mass. 2014) (No. SJC-11373) 2012 WL 10669000, at *43 [hereinafter Commonwealth 'sBrie];
Brief of Amicus Curiae the Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, at 6-8, Commonwealth v.
Duncan, 7 N.E.3d 469 (No. SJC-11373), 2013 WL6051368, at *6-8 (expounding that legislative
history is indicative of salient policy concerns regarding preventing animal cruelty). In 2012, the
legislature passed an act to further regulate animal control, suggesting that treatment of animals is
of concern. See 2012 Mass. Acts 193, § 174E(a)-(b); see also Laura Hagen, Legislative Review:
2012 Legislative Review, 19 ANIMAL L. 497, 533-36 (2013) (illustrating changes and purpose of
amendment to section 77). The Act specifically regulates standards of conditions that dog owners
shall comply with. See 2012 Mass. Acts 193, § 174E(a)-(b).
36 See Commonwealth v. Magoon, 51 N.E. 1082, 1082-83 (Mass. 1898) (convicting
defendant of cruelty, regardless of intent because cruelty in fact occurred); Commonwealth v.
Curry, 23 N.E. 212, 213 (Mass. 1890) (holding leaving horse harnessed outside without
sustenance and shelter constitutes cruelty); Turner, 14 N.E. at 132 (applying anti-cruelty statute to
fox because defendant's actions were against public morals); Commonwealth v. Zalesky, 906
N.E.2d 349, 351 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009) (defining animal cruelty as "unnecessary cruelty" and
"[s]evere pain ... without any justifiable cause"); see also 2012 U.S. Animal Protection Laws
Rankings, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND (Dec. 17, 2012), http://aldf.org/press-room/press-

releases/2012-u-s-animal-protection-laws-rankings/ (showing Massachusetts ranks in top tier of
country for animal protection laws); The HSUS Releases Annual Ranking of State Animal
Protection Laws, THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES (Jan. 15, 2013),

http://www.humanesociety.org/new s/press releases/2013 /01/humane-state-ranking-report-201 2011513.html (ranking Massachusetts second for state animal protection laws).
37 See, e.g., State v. Fessenden, 310 P.3d 1163, 1168 (Or. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that
emergency aid doctrine extends to animal life); see also Morgan v. State, 656 S.E.2d 857, 860
(Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that warrantless entry to aid animals in distress permissible
under exigent circumstances); State v. Berry, 92 S.W.3d 823, 830 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003)
(acknowledging circumstances can justify warrantless entry to aid suffering animals, despite not
applying it here); State v. Goulet, 21 A.3d 302, 314-15 (R.I. 2011) (establishing that officers did
not impinge on rights by checking on dog's welfare); State v. Bauer, 379 N.W.2d 895, 899-900
(Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (allowing warrantless entry to rescue horse).
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doctrine in light of animal protection, only thirteen courts have taken
decisive stances, while others, including the Massachusetts Appeals Court,
have adroitly circumvented it, seemingly to avoid directly confronting the
query.3 8 In previous cases where the question has surfaced, courts were
reluctant and successfully evaded this issue by finding alternative routes to
apply the doctrine to preservation of human life or not applying it
altogether.39 The issue has proven to be a battle between old and modem

views of animal law, as well as one between preservation of Fourth
Amendment rights and animal cruelty prevention. 40 Like thirteen other
state courts have elected to do, the SJC in Duncan unanimously rejected
38 See Commonwealth v. Erickson, 905 N.E.2d 127, 130 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009) (using less
restrictive reasoning when court had opportunity to address issue). The Appeals Court confined
their decision to whether the officers' entering the defendant's property without a warrant was
proper given their knowledge of dead dogs on the property. Id. Instead of interpreting the
emergency aid doctrine to extend to animals, though they acknowledged the issue, the court
ultimately avoided it completely by reasoning that the officers had an objectively reasonable
belief that a human corpse was on the property. See id; see also Shapiro v. City of Glen Cove,
236 F. App'x. 645, 646 (2d Cir. 2007) (suggesting possibility that doctrine could apply to
animals); Siebert v. Serverino, 256 F.3d 648, 657 (7th Cir. 2001) (intimating, without deciding,
that "[e]xigent circumstances may justify a warrantless seizure of animals"); DiCesare v. Stuart,

12 F.3d 973, 977-78 (10th Cir. 1993).

39 See Commonwealth v.Hurd, 743 N.E.2d 841, 845 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (addressing
application to animals unnecessary because officers were unable to conclude that exigency
existed); see also Shapiro, 236 F. App'x. at 647 (concluding that officer's facts not supportive of
emergency situation's existence, thus inquiry ends there); Erickson, 905 N.E.2d at 130 ("[It was]
...
clear that the officer was justified in his belief that the tenant could be inside the apartment and
was injured, dying, or dead.").
40 See Brief for Appellee, supra note 32, at *23-24 (upholding traditional application to
humans and emphasizing animals' inferior status in law). But see Commonwealth 's Brief supra
note 35, at *43-44 (arguing for heightened status for animals and tying argument to betterment of
human society). Duncan reiterated that the conventional views that animals are regarded as
property in the eyes of the law and moved for adherence to these longstanding laws. See Brieffor
Appellee, supra note 32, at *23-24; see also Massachusetts Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 158 N.E.2d 487, 495 (Mass. 1959) (affirming that rights of
animals are not protected by Constitution); Commonwealth v. Higgins, 178 N.E. 536, 537 (Mass.
1931) (imparting that despite policy interest in animal cruelty prevention, such acts only violate
moral standards). Conversely, the Commonwealth contended that public policy favors expansion
of animal rights, not just exclusively for the reason of protection animal life, but also to improve
society. Commonwealth's Brief supra note 35, at *41-44; see Higgins, 178 N.E. at 537
(discussing statute was intended to support state's policy of suppressing unnecessary suffering of
animals); Commonwealth v. Tilton, 49 Mass. (8 Met.) 232, 234-35 (1844) (holding defendant
was rightfully convicted because cock-fighting is cruel and inhumane). The Commonwealth
counters Duncan's argument that acts of cruelty as only being against public morals by arguing
that this enforcement of animal rights is necessary to assist in preservation public morals,
ultimately leading to a better society. See Commonwealth's Brief supra note 35, at *41-42. To
further justify their contention, the Commonwealth also argued that this new application will
serve the purpose of preserving human life because animal cruelty has been linked to
interpersonal violence. Id. at *44; see also PAMELA CARLISLE-FRANK & TOM FLANAGAN,
SILENT VICTIMS: RECOGNIZING AND STOPPING ABUSE OF THE FAMILY PET 25 (2006).
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traditional views on41animal rights and unequivocally read the exception to
apply to animal life.
In this interpretation, the SJC in Duncan relied primarily on public
policy to account for the dearth of controlling case law.42 The issue here

was not whether an emergency existed, but rather, whether this particular
type of emergency, specifically one involving animals in need of care,
invokes the doctrine. 43 To establish a basis for their opinion, the SJC
borrowed pieces from cases furthering protection of animal rights in
tandem with public policy considerations. 44 By analyzing the legislative
history behind chapter 272 section 77, as well as other cruelty prevention

statutes, it was inferred that the Legislature has taken a prominent interest
in the advancement of animal rights . The SJC's conclusion was that the
officers' warrantless entry to provide aid to dogs in need comported with
this important policy interest evinced by lawmakers.46
41

See Commonwealth v. Duncan, 7 N.E.3d 469, 475 (holding that emergency aid exception

can be applied to animal life); Fessenden 310 P.3d at 1168 (applying doctrine to animals);
Goulet, 21 A.3d at 314-15 (reasoning that warrantless entry to aid animals was not intrusion on
privacy right); see also Scott Heiser, The Rule of Reason Prevails Emergency Aid Exception
Applies to Save the Life of Animals, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, (Sept. 6, 2013),
http://aldf.org/blog/the-rule-of-reason-prevails-emergency-aid-exception-applies-to-save-the-lifeof-animals/ (discussing emergence of doctrine's application to animals in courts).
42 See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 473 (using doctrine's application to nonhuman life to address
legislative concern for animal cruelty); see also Ruth Payne, Animal Welfare, Animal Rights, and
the Path to Social Reform: One Movement's Struggle for Coherency in the Quest for Change, 9
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L 587, 619-22 (2002) (discussing court's role in determining progress of
animal rights refornation).
43 See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474 (explaining that issue at hand is question of law not fact).
44 See id. at 473-74 (inferring public policy considerations from applicable statutes); see also
Paula J. Frasso, Note, The Massachusetts Anti-Cruelty Statute: A Real Dog-A Proposalfor a ReDraft of the Current Law, 35 NEw. ENG. L. REv. 1003, 1006-08 (2001) (explicating need for
animal cruelty statutes to advance animal rights). In Massachusetts, the SJC laid the foundation
for which future animal rights advocates can use to bolster their positions, creating a more
powerful mechanism that can be used by animal rights advocates. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 47374 (providing framework for public policy against animal cruelty).
45 See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 473 (noting statutory focus on intentional and negligent animal
cruelty); see also Tuck v. United States, 477 A.2d 1115, 1120 (D.C. 1984) (reasoning that public
policy interest in cruelty prevention requires degree of flexibility with warrant requirement);
Commonwealth v. Yee, 281 N.E.2d 248, 252 (Mass. 1972) ("[Plublic policy is a basic source of
law when no previous decision or rule of law is applicable."); State v. Fessenden, 310 P.3d 1163,
1168 (Or. Ct. App. 2013) (explaining public policy concerns are embedded in statutes therefore
court must further animal rights accordingly); Pine v. State, 889 S.W.2d 625, 631 (Tex. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that emergency aid doctrine permitted officer's warrantless entry to rescue
mistreated colt); State v. Bauer, 379 N.W.2d 895, 899-900 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (ruling in favor
of providing aid to animals in need driven by statutory intent); see also Hagen, supra note 36 at
533-36 (illustrating rationale driving modifications to section 77).
46 See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474 (reasoning necessity of applying exception to animals in
order for police to effectively perform duties); see also Morgan v. State, 656 S.E.2d 857, 859-60
(2008) (permitting warrantless search and seizure to rescue starving dogs); State v. Stone, 92 P.3d
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The SJC decisively stood with the appellant in the struggle between
adhering to the status quo or expanding the law, completely rejecting
Duncan's arguments.47 Maintaining the law in its current form was too
unforgiving, giving way to a more policy-oriented approach. 48
In
additional to the bold policy arguments, the SJC's decision also furthers the
statute's purpose by giving more teeth to it. 49 The concern that this
application would result in a gradual atrophy of individuals' exception of
privacy under the Fourth Amendment and Article 14 was pacified by the
court's explanation that this holding was not so much an expansion, but

more so a separate, new application. 50

Therefore, the Constitutional

1178, 1183-84 (Mont. 2004) (holding warrantless search justifiable to prevent animal suffering);
People v. Rogers, 708 N.Y.S.2d 795, 797 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) ("The fact that no human life
was in danger does not vitiate the urgency of the rescue.").
47 See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 473 (deciding that animal rights law must be expanded in
accordance with statutory intent); see also Commonwealth Brief supra note 35, at *39-40 (noting

SJC has long recognized numerous statutes indicative of policy prohibiting animal cruelty); Brief
for Appellee, supra note 32, at *27 (arguing animals are considered property and not afforded
constitutional protections like people). Though the court completely departed from the law as it
stood, they did not extend as far as the Appellant's argument about relating the doctrine's
application to animals in the context of interpersonal violence. See Commonwealth's Brief supra
note 35, at *43 -44 (explaining body of scientific evidence linking animal cruelty to interpersonal
violence and abuse within families); see also Sherry Ramsey, Mary Lou Randour, Nancy Blaney
& Maya Gupta, ProtectingDomestic Violence Victims by ProtectingTheir Pets, JUVENILE AND
FAMILY
JUSTICE
TODAY
2012,
at
16-17,
available
at
http://www.ahimsahouse.org/sites/default/files/spring20lOfeature.pdf
(researching
statistics
linking animal abuse to domestic violence).
48 See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474 (illustrating that warrantless searches to protect animals is
consistent with public policy against animal mistreatment). Duncan argued that traditional law
viewing animals as chattel precluded animal life from being encompassed within the scope of the
small category of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment and Article Fourteen. See Brief for
Appellee, supra note 32, at *22 (arguing that emergency aid doctrine has never applied to
animals). However, the SJC reasoned that application to nonhuman life was reasonable in light
of the strong societal interest in preventing harm to animals inflicted by humans. See Duncan, 7
N.E.3d at 476.
49 See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474 (explaining that hindering officers' ability to take proactive
action would be illogical); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Ass'n,
Inc., Commonwealth v. Duncan, 7 N.E.3d 469 (Mass. 2014) (No. SJC-11373), 2013 WL
5888476, at *29-30 [hereinafter Chiefs of Police] (contending that police require extension of
doctrine to animals in order to effectively fulfill duties). Unless the responding officers have the
tool given by this interpretation of the doctrine, action seeking to hold those who engage in acts
of cruelty accountable can only be taken after the harm has occurred. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at
474. A contrary holding would not be conducive to proactive action to protect the welfare of
animals, thereby frustrating the intent behind the statute. Id.
50 See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474-76 (considering factors to weigh when applying exception to
animal life); see also Davis v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1043, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that
animal cruelty caused by humans created emergency circumstances to support warrantless
search); Fessenden, 310 P.3d at 1169 (stating that species of animal is to be considered). By
performing the analysis on a case-by-case basis to decide whether application is proper, the
privacy right would not be arbitrarily infringed upon. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 475. A criterion
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protection against arbitrary
governmental searches and seizures would
51
remain well-preserved.
This new application of the exception to animal life appears to be purely
grounded in public policy and although it is novel, it was not intended to be
an expansion or alteration, but a separate facet in itself 52 Though the
SJC's final conclusion was correct because the spirit and rationale that
drove the opinion was righteous, they left little guidance for future
application of with their articulation of such an amorphous standard. 53 The
decision in Duncan lays the groundwork for future decisions regarding
animal rights to build upon, but many holes to be filled by future decisions
remain as a consequence of this reticent approach. 54 Subsequent cases
with more factors to consider should be utilized, which furthers the societal interest in cruelty
prevention, while safeguarding this Constitutional right. See id Rather than sweeping more
circumstances under the doctrine, this application is to exist separately and distinctly from the
application as traditionally applied. See id.The threshold for this inquiry is heightened with the
additional considerations, such as the nature of the property interest, whether the harm resulted
from human acts, the extent of the intrusion and efforts to obtain consent of the property owner,
which will serve as defenses against attrition of the right of expectation to privacy. See id.at 476.
51 See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 475 (concluding essential framework for determining warrantless
search not altered by application to animals).
52 See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 475 ("[A]pplication to nonhuman animals does not
expand the
exception or alter the essential framework for determining when a warrantless police search of the
home is permissible under it."). To apply the emergency aid exception, officers must have
objective reason to believe that an injury exists or that there is imminent danger of physical harm.
Id. The decision in Duncan adds more consideration to the "essential framework" when dealing
with emergencies involving animal life, intended to curtail the expansion and maintain the
narrowness of exceptions to the warrant requirement. See id.at 475-76 (mentioning factors to
apply when applying search warrant exception to animals).
" See id.at 475-76 (outlining factors to consider when applying exception to animals, but
not providing bright-line rule); see also Frasso, supra note 44, at 1010 (suggesting need to
strengthen statutes designed to counter animal cruelty); Payne, supra note 42, 601-02 (discussing
courts' role in advancing policy interest in animal rights). Absent strong statutes with adequate
penalties aimed at animal cruelty prevention, animal rights movements will suffer due to lack of
enforcement. See Payne, supra note 42, at 603. Here, the SJC has provided the necessary
enforcement to advance this interest by creating a tool for officers that enables them to effectively
utilize proactive measures in protecting animal welfare.
See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 473
(emphasizing need for preventative measures).
54 See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 475-76 (explaining that inquiries involving animals
done on caseby-case basis accounting additional considerations). One prominent factor in the analysis of
whether the suffering resulted from human action because this is directly in accordance with the
rationale of the statute. See id.at 475. The driving rationale behind the animal cruelty statute is
to protect animals in vulnerable conditions stemming from mistreatment by humans, therefore if
this factor is present, application of the emergency aid exception to animals is more favorable.
See id.at 475-76; see also Davis, 907 N.E.2d at 1050 (concluding animal cruelty caused by
humans creates exigent circumstances to permit warrantless search). Because a prominent
rationale in this decision was the preservation of society's interest in cruelty prevention and
preservation of public morals, human-caused cruelty has a significantly lower threshold than
emergencies resulting from accident. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 476; Commonwealth v. Higgins,
178 N.E. 536, 538 (Mass. 1931) (reasoning that cruel and barbarous acts of animal cruelty tend to
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addressing this issue will be faced with the task of coloring in the lines of
the emergency aid doctrine's application to animals using the guidance
provided in this decision.55 The fine-tuning of test, such as to which species
of animals shall be included and the reasonable extent of intrusion, will

devolve to later cases to determine how the Constitutional rights of the
individual will be balanced against policy interests in order to minimize
interference with privacy rights of individuals.56 Ultimately, the question
as to when the emergency aid exception's application
to animal
57

emergencies ceases to be reasonable has yet to unfold.

corrupt public morals). When applying a totality of circumstances inquiry to emergencies
involving animals, factors to analyze include the species of the animal, the nature of the privacy
interest, what efforts, if any were made to contact the property owner prior to entry, as well as the
extent of the intrusion, however this list is merely illustrative, not exhaustive. See Duncan, 7
N.E.3d at 476; see also Suss v. Am. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 823 F. Supp.
181, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (discussing varying levels of protections to different property types
with highest level afforded to dwellings); Fessenden, 310 P.3d at 1169 (imparting that
warrantless entry to rescue horse suffering from starvation was permissible). The ultimate
inquiry that the application of the emergency aid exception turns on whether the entry was
reasonable, which this tentative list of factors is to assist in determining. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at
475; Commonwealth v. Townsend, 902 N.E.2d 388, 397 (Mass. 2009) (affirming that "the
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness."').
The several factors
mentioned are to be considered in the totality of the circumstances assessment of the emergency,
however this may not provide sufficient guidance to address future unforeseen situations,
rendering its application difficult. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 476 (discussing possible factors to
weigh).
55 See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 475-76 (discussing factors to consider when applying exception
to animals but not announcing bright-line standards).
56 See id.at 475-76 (explaining "other factors appropriately enter the calculus in determining
whether such entry is justified"); see also Fessenden, 333 P.3d at 283 (recognizing importance of
"a clear, workable, and consistent" application for emergencies involving animals). The standard
articulated by the SJC presents an illustrative list of factors that may contribute to the analysis,
however this test is far from a "clear, workable, and consistent" exception. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d
at 475-76. One such issue preventing this standard from being consistent and workable is the
broad meaning behind the term, "animal." See Commonwealth v. Turner, 14 N.E. 130, 132
(Mass. 1887) (concluding that "animal" includes all "irrational beings"); Knox v. Mass. Soc'y for
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 425 N.E.2d 393, 396 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (determining that
goldfish were within definition of "animal"; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 80 (5th ed.
1979) (defining "animal" as "non-human, animate being which is endowed with the power of
voluntary motiof').
57 See Turner, 14 N.E. at 132 (including all "irrational beings" within definition of
"animal"); Knox, 425 N.E.2d at 396 (concluding that goldfish are animals); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 80 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "animal" as "non-human, animate being which is
endowed with the power of voluntary motiof'); see also Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (averring
that the "ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness'). Though the term
"animal" may encompass basically all living creatures, it does not sensibly follow that all animals
are to receive equal treatment, as this would be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and
Article Fourteen. See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403; see also Turner, 14 N.E. at 132. Applying
the doctrine to a warrantless entry to rescue a goldfish may be hyperbolic, but the question to
what extent this application extends to different species remains unanswered because the SJC
stated that the species of the animal shall be considered. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474-75; see
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The variance within the term "animal" is not the only open-ended issue
here, but this decision leaves room for other complications that may cloud
the righteousness of this holding, including implications for the plain view
doctrine, as well as family law. 58 Application of the emergency aid
doctrine would create more situations for officers to lawfully be on private
property, which in turn creates more possibilities for situations that could
trigger the plain view doctrine. 59 Because Duncan was charged with

also Knox, 425 N.E.2d at 396 (holding goldfish to be considered animals). The SJC provided that
the extent of the intrusion should be considered in determining whether a warrantless entry was
reasonable. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 476 (stating extent of intrusion shall be analyzed). Because
officers entered Duncan's yard to seize the dogs, this issue of reasonableness did not surface,
however it is unclear when a warrantless entry encroaches onto unreasonableness. See Suss, 823
F. Supp. at 187 (explaining breaking through wall to save cat accidentally trapped outside scope
of emergency aid doctrine); Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 470 (noting officers entered yard); see also
Tuck v. United States, 477 A.2d 1115, 1120 (D.C. 1984) (requiring flexibility of warrant
requirement in order to preserve life). Although reasonableness, the touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment, requires flexibility for emergencies, a standard that is too amorphous may lead to
unreasonable applications of the exception. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474-75 (setting up factors to
be analyzed); Tuck, 447 A.2d at 1120 (reasoning warrant requirement should retain some
flexibility).
58 See Corso Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. Cir. Ct. 1979) ("[A] pet is
not just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere between a person and a piece of personal
property."); Fessenden, 333 P.3d at 284 (explicating some statutes show "some animals, such as
pets, occupy a unique position in people's hearts and in the law."); Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A.2d.
630, 632-33 (Vt. 1997) (reasoning dog is companion and thus should be treated differently from
chattel). The court in Kroupa distinguished a pet from livestock by focusing on the fact that pets
are companions to humans, which evidences that there are different classes of animals. See
Kroupa, 702 A.2d at 632. Duncan has left the framework for application of the emergency aid
doctrine indefinite in regards to which species are animals are protected because the SJC
imparting that the species of the animal shall be included in the equation, while providing limited
guidance for which species fall beyond reasonableness. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474. Due to the
elevated status of pets as companions, they are among the intended class of animals for which this
interpretation has been fashioned. See id. at 474-75; see also Fessenden, 310 P.3d at 1169
(reasoning species of animal is consideration). This case involved cruelty to dogs, which as
companions, are entitled to elevated status. See id. at 474-75; Fessenden, 333 P.3d at 284; Corso
Dog & Cat Hosp. Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d at 183; See also Chiefs of Police, supra note 49, at *34
(describing relationship of companionship humans have with dogs and cats). From this analysis,
it would follow that a distinction between classes of animals, such as pets, livestock, and game,
exists and that they will receive differential treatment under the exception. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d
at 474-75; Fessenden, 310 P.3d at 1169. While it is settled that dogs are clearly within the
exception, the application to other classes and species are undetermined. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d
at 474-75; Fessenden, 310 P.3d at 1169. By distinguishing between the species of animals, the
SJC is clarifying that the doctrine does not apply to all animal life, thereby minimizing the
abridgement of privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article Fourteen. See Duncan, 7
N.E.3d at 474-75; Fessenden, 310 P.3d at 1169. However, there is no guidance on how to
analyze which species fall within a class covered by the doctrine, which could result in confusing
ramifications. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474-75.
59 See Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 1971) ("[It has long been settled that
objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence."); Commonwealth v. Balicki, 762
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animal cruelty, a crime related directly to the evidence seized (i.e. the
dogs), the implications surrounding the plain view doctrine, if any, are
unclear. 60 Another area of law that may be potentially affected is family
law, specifically circumstances surrounding domestic violence, because of
the nexus between the propensity to commit acts of animal cruelty and
interpersonal violence .61 In recognizing this connection, several state
N.E.2d 290, 296-97 (Mass. 2002) (applying plain view doctrine to evidence seized);
Commonwealth v. Tyree, 919 N.E.2d 660, 677-78 (Mass. 2010) (discussing components of plain
view doctrine's application).
60 See Root, 438 F.2d at 363 (explaining circumstances when plain view doctrine can be
utilized). With the advent of the emergency aid exception's application to animals, officers are
now permitted to lawfully be on private property for the purposes of aiding suffering animals.
See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 476. If an officer meets the requirements to lawfully be on private
property for purposes of rendering aid to animals, then seizure of any other unlawful possession
in plain view will be proper. See Root, 438 F.2d at 364-65 (explaining requirements for plain
view seizure to be proper); Balicki, 762 N.E.2d at 296-97 (noting Massachusetts requires police
to come across item inadvertently for plain view doctrine to apply); Tyree, 919 N.E.2d at 678
("Under the plain view doctrine, 'if police are lawfully in a position from which they can view an
object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have lawful right
to access object, they may seize it without a warrant."'). Issues with applying the plain view
doctrine are foreseeable and could be problematic due to the insufficient guidance for the
application of the emergency aid exception to animals in the Duncan opinion. See Duncan, 7
N.E.3d at 476 (listing factors to consider in analysis but not providing clear rule). In Goulet, such
a situation arose when officers responded to an emergency situation involving animal cruelty and
seized illegal weapons found in plain view. See State v. Goulet, 21 A.3d 302, 305 (R.I. 2011).
Without a clearer standard for application of the emergency aid doctrine to animal life,
determinations of whether officers were lawfully permitted to be on private property to rescue
suffering animals will be inconsistent, giving way to potential misuses of the plain view doctrine.
See id. (establishing protean standard of application); see also Root, 438 F.2d at 363 (stating that
officer may seize evidence in plain view if lawfully on property); Goulet, 21 A.3d at 313-14
(holding officers properly on property to aid dogs thus seizure of saw-off shotgun was proper).
61 See CARLISLE-FRANK & FLANAGAN, supra note 40, at 9 (discussing link between animal
abuse and domestic violence). The Commonwealth introduced the argument that the protection
of animal life could be considered an ancillary purpose of this application, with the primary
purpose being emphasis on public morals. See Commonwealth's Brief supra note 35, at *43-44
(explaining scientific evidence correlating animal cruelty with domestic violence). However, the
SJC abstained from addressing this argument, hinting that their intent was to focus on
preservation of animal welfare. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 469-75. Moreover, the SJC ignored
altogether the Appellant-Commonwealth's contention that this application is relevant to the
connection between animal abuse and interpersonal violence. Id. Leaving this piece of the
Commonwealth's contention untouched was correct because acknowledging it would have
resulted in unknown implications for domestic violence proceedings. See CARLISLE-FRANK &
FLANAGAN, supra note 40, at 199 (discussing collaboration between law enforcement and animal
protection agencies to prevent interpersonal violence); Craig U. Uchida et al. Evaluating a MultiDisciplinaryResponse to Domestic Violence: The DVERT Program in Colorado Springs, Final
Report,
NAT'L
INST.
OF
JUSTICE,
at
35
(June
2001),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/188261.pdf (describing need for animal control
officers to be part of multi-disciplinary response to domestic violence). Officers responding to
aid animals in need could spill over into domestic violence proceedings because of this link
between animal cruelty and domestic abuse. See Uchida et. al., supra. If a relationship is drawn
between this new application of the emergency aid doctrine, which is a tool for officers to prevent
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legislatures have enacted laws that permit temporary restraining orders for
pets. 62 Emergence of the collaboration between law enforcement and
animal welfare agencies could spell unclear implications for domestic
violence issues when faced with emergency situations involving animal
cruelty.63

When presented with this new issue, the SJC decisively answered the
question that some other courts have previously avoided confronting and
allowed the doctrine's application to animals, despite there being more
conservative approaches available. 64 Though the SJC relied on the
animal cruelty, and domestic violence, a panoply of unforeseen consequences could lead to
infringement of Fourth Amendment and Article Fourteen rights. See Commonwealth's Brief
supra note 35, at *43-33 (stating that application to animals needed assist in prevention of
interpersonal violence); see also CARLISLE-FRANK & FLANAGAN, supra note 40, at 199
(discussing law enforcement's role in domestic abuse prevention through partnership with animal
protection agencies).
62 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209(A), § 11(a)-(c) (2012) (promulgating that temporary
restraining orders can protect pets); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6320 (Deering 2014) (permitting
temporary restraining orders for pets); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5 (protecting
animals under domestic violence theory); CONN. GEN. STAT. 15 (2014) (same); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 586-4 (2014) (same); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 112A-14 (2014) (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
46:2135 (2014) (same); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 4007 (2013) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
33.018 030 (2014) (same); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (Consol. 2014) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT.
50B-3 (2014) (same); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 36-3-606 (West 2014) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 1103(c)(2)(G) (West 2014) (same); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.060 (2014) (same).
63 See Gupta, supra note 47, at 19-20 (delineating statistics showing relationship between
animal and domestic abuse); see also CARLISLE-FRANK & FLANAGAN, supra note 40, at 198-99
(discussing need for partnership between officers and animal welfare agencies for effective abuse
prevention). In the future, given an appropriate case, the SJC might be able to utilize a similar
reasoning as they did in the instant case and infer a policy rationale from chapter 209(A) that the
legislature intended that pinpointing cruelty to animals shall be a tool to prevent domestic abuse;
this new application of the emergency aid doctrine could provide such a prevention tool if that
were the case. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209(A), § 11(a)-(c); Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474
(inferring policy rationale from statutes to justify reasoning); see also Commonwealth v. Yee,
281 N.E.2d 248, 252 (Mass. 1972) ("[P]ublic policy is a basic source of law when no previous
decision or rule of law is applicable.").
64 See People v. Rogers, 708 N.Y.S.2d, 795, 796-97 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (encompassing
animals into definition of "property" to protect them under emergency aid doctrine); see also
State v. Bauer, 379 N.W.2d 895, 898 (Wis. 1985) (explaining that defendant had no privacy
interest where officers could view animal from public space). The New York state court
successfully protected animal life without directly stating that the emergency aid exception shall
apply to animals through other avenues, such as locating the rights of animals within the
definition of property. See Rogers, 708 N.Y.S.2d at 796 (finding that emergency aid doctrine
covers protection of property and animals are property). The SJC in Duncan may have been
reserved in this construction of a test for the doctrine's application to animals, but did not employ
the same level of caution as other state courts did. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474 (emphasizing
that doctrine protects life and property and animals are within term "life"); cf Rogers, 708
N.Y.S.2d at 796-97 (finding that animals fall within the property component of the exception);
Bauer, 379 N.W.2d at 897 (reasoning that intrusion was justified since defendant had no
expectation of privacy on common driveway). More cautious approaches were used by other
state courts and the SJC could have elected to fit the facts of this case into similar moderate
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decisions of other state courts, they did not employ the same conservative
reasonings as some did, but instead, unanimously decided to apply the
65
exception to animal life, disregarding the more reserved alternatives.
This decision illustrates the rapid and progressive evolution of the law
surrounding animal rights in Massachusetts.6 6 Duncan is suggestive that
the SJC is prepared to take the reins in driving animal rights forward and to
provide a foundation to help propel future courts into advancing animal
rights.6 7 While this decision is beneficial for animal rights, the SJC's

applications. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474 (electing to categorize animal emergencies as
involving preservation of life rather than property); cf Bauer, 379 N.W.2d at 897 (explaining
warrantless entry to rescue animals was proper were defendant had no "justifiable expectation of
privacy"). Another more reticent approach available was the approach used in Bauer, where the
court held that the lack of the defendant's expectation of privacy rendered the warrantless entry
permissible to rescue the aid the horse. See Bauer, 379 N.W.2d at 898; see also Florida v. Riley,
488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy existed regarding
aerial view of defendant's greenhouse). But see Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 469 (noting officers were
able to view dogs by stepping onto snow bank on public street).
65 See cases cited supra note 6 and accompanying text (explaining SJC's progressive
application of emergency aid doctrine to animals); see also Chiefs of Police, supra note 49, at *23 (discussing progressive history of animal rights law in Massachusetts); 2012 US. Animal
Protection Laws Rankings, supra note 36(showing that Massachusetts among states with
strongest animal protection laws); The HSUS Releases Annual Ranking of State Animal
Protection Laws, supra note 36 (establishing Massachusetts tied for second strongest animal
protection laws). Aligning the instant case with the rationale of Rogers by declaring that animals
fit within the doctrine's purpose of preserving property was possible, but instead the SJC
completely departed from this rationale by reasoning that protecting nonhuman life "fits
coherently within the existing emergency aid exception" because its purpose is to preserve life.
See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474 (emphasizing and italicizing "life" rather than "property"); see also
Rogers, 708 N.Y.S.2d at 796-97 (encompassing animals into definition of "property"). If the SJC
placed animals within the property component of the doctrine, the protection of animal life would
have still been advanced, however it would be a more gradual progression. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d
at 474 (choosing to highlight "life" rather than "property").
66 See Commonwealth v. Higgins, 178 N.E. 536, 538 (Mass. 1931) (reasoning that cruel
and
barbarous acts of animal cruelty tend to corrupt public morals); Commonwealth v. Turner, 14
N.E. 130, 132 (Mass. 1887) (concluding defendant's actions deemed, "against public morals").
Historically, animal cruelty preventions laws were focused on preservation of public morals of
society, but the reasoning in Duncan evidences the evolution of animal rights and the way in
which focus has shifted to purely concerning animals. See Higgins, 178 N.E. at 538; Turner, 14
N.E. at 132; see also Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474-75 (explicating animal cruelty prevention is
important policy concern). This decision is consistent with Massachusetts's ranking as one of the
states with the most progressive state animal protection laws. See 2012 U.S. Animal Protection
Laws Rankings, supra note 36; The HSUS Release Annual Ranking of State Animal Protection
Laws, supra note 36.
67 See Payne, supra note 42, at 619 (discussing animal rights movement lacks "legislative
foundation" to build movement upon). Although animals are afforded more protections today,
their traditional disposition as property has severely inhibited the movement for animal rights.
See id.; see also Mass. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 158
N.E.2d 487, 493 (Mass. 1959) (construing lost dogs and cats as abandoned property). Regardless
of their importance to society, it is challenging to expand animal rights due to lack of guiding
decisions results in low odds of prevailing in court. See Payne, supra note 42, at 619, 629. The
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amorphous standard for this expansive application could lead to
inconsistent application by trial courts. 68 As this court did, other state
courts with little guidance can rely on this decision's reasoning if faced
with the same issue of determining
whether to apply the emergency aid
69
exception to preserve animal life.
Freedom against arbitrary government intrusions, specifically
unwarranted searches and seizures, can be compromised if the interest in
preserving life or property outweighs the privacy rights of individuals.
However, this right is not absolute, giving way to reasonable and carefully
delineated exceptions, such as the emergency aid doctrine. The intent to
protect human life was palpable for this doctrine's existence, but gradually,
the protection of animal life has emerged as another purpose behind this
exception, as shown by the SJC's decision in Duncan. The decision in the
affirmative gives impetus to the force of the animal rights movement,
however it leaves much to unfold in future cases, since the SJC set forth a
cursory test to address emergencies surrounding animal life.
Each
additional exception to the right against unwarranted entry into one's
private domain is an evisceration of this right and thus, there must be
carefully crafted standards for each exception, which has yet to develop for
SJC in Duncan and the other state courts that have applied the emergency aid doctrine to animals
have significantly bolstered animal rights movements by providing the necessary basis to
reinforce their arguments. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 469. With the SJC's bold decision in
Duncan, there is now firm support for the animal rights movement in Massachusetts. See id; see
also Payne, supra note 42, at 619, 629.
68 See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 475-76 (articulating amorphous totality of circumstances
standard); Rogers, 708 N.Y.S.2d at 796-97 (including animals in definition of "property" to
protect them under doctrine). Sweeping animal life under the definition of property for purposes
of applying the doctrine, which allows for preservation of property, would have yielded the same
result. See Rogers, 708 N.Y.S.2d at 796-97. Despite this availability of a more gradual approach,
the SJC chose to classify emergencies involving animals into the portion of the doctrine that
permits warrantless entry for preservation of life. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474. This reading is
problematic due to the tremendous variance within the term "life" as it applies to animals and at
point at which the exception ceases to be reasonable is uncertain. See supra note 55 and
accompanying text (discussing carrying definitions of "animals" and reasonableness of applying
emergency aid exception).
69 See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474 (stating decision accords with highest courts of other states
and agreeing with their rationales). The SJC arrived at their decision by borrowing support and
rationales from out-of-state authorities. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474 (citing other jurisdictions
that applied exception to animals in distress). Additionally, the SJC's approach of extracting
policy rationales from state statutes mimics that of the Fessenden court, a decision which was
heavily relied upon. See id.; see also State v. Fessenden, 310 P.3d 1163, 1168 (Or. 2013)
(inferring "strong societal interest" from statutes). As more states address this question,
application of the doctrine to protect animal life will decrease in novelty. See Duncan, 7 N.E.3d
at 474 (noting strong societal interest in preventing animal cruelty). Duncan may assist in
guiding future states determining this issue, however they cannot look to this decision's test, as it
opens the door for an amalgam of different issues. See id. at 475-76 (listing illustrative factors to
consider when assessing emergencies involving animal life).
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inquiries of applying the exception to animals. Positive ramifications will
certainly flow from this decision, however it leaves the issue standing at the
precipice of a "slippery slope." Failing to preserve life, human or animal,
is an anathema to the spirit of the Constitution, but failing to adequately
preserve a fundamental right so deeply grounded in the Nation's history is
no different. Although the SJC assures that the right is well-protected, such
an assurance holds little weight absent a more carefully delineated
standard.
KassandraC. Tat

